Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

9-1-2009

Maybe Dick Speidel Was Right about Court
Adjustment
Robert A. Hillman
Cornell Law School, rah16@cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, and the
Remedies Commons
Recommended Citation
Hillman, Robert A., "Maybe Dick Speidel Was Right about Court Adjustment" (2009). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 539.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/539

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Maybe Dick Speidel Was Right About

Court Adjustment

ROBERT A. HILLMAN*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

I1.
III.

IV.
V.

IN TRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 59 6
SPEIDEL ON COURT A DJUSTMENT ...................................................................... 596
JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO COURT ADJUSTMENT INA
NU T SH ELL ..................................................................
59 8
A.
JudicialResponses ...................................................................................
598
B.
Scholarly D iscussions ..............................................................................
600
1. Im m ediate Reactions.........................................................................
600
2. M ore Recent D iscussions ..................................................................
602
SPEIDEL M AY HAVE BEEN RIGHT ...................................................................... 604
C ONCLU SIO N ................................................................
607

Dick Speidel was a giant in the field of contract and commercial law
for over four decades and a respected leader in legal education and law
reform. Still, to his great credit, he did not take himself too seriously
and always saw the other side of issues on which he opined. So when
his measured support for court adjustment of long-term supply contracts
that were disrupted by unanticipated circumstances unleashed an
immediate barrage of criticism, characteristically, Speidel processed the
responses with a smile.

* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to David
Hoffman for very helpful comments on a draft and to Mark Grube for excellent research
assistance.

HeinOnline -- 46 San Diego L. Rev. 595 2009

I. INTRODUCTION
As the title of this Article suggests, I will argue that Dick Speidel may
have been correct in asserting that court adjustment makes sense in
limited circumstances. But years ago, I allied myself with Speidel and I
will only briefly review my reasons why here.' My main goal in this
Article is to argue that nothing courts have decided or writers have
analyzed since Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc. (ALCOA), a
somewhat infamous case in which the court adjusted a long-term
contract, proves that court adjustment is always wrongheaded. In fact,
as with so many policy issues, we may never identify the best judicial
approach to disrupted long-term contracts because resolution depends on
too many variables and unknowns. 2 So Speidel may have been right. Of
course, he also may have been wrong.
I will focus on recent literature and cases to enumerate the unresolved
questions about court adjustment. Part II briefly reviews Speidel's
approach to court adjustment. Part III outlines the judicial and scholarly
reaction to court adjustment, focusing on the more recent treatments.
Part IV claims that too many questions remain unanswered to know
whether Speidel was right or wrong.
II.

SPEIDEL ON COURT ADJUSTMENT

The decision in ALCOA 3 engendered a spirited debate in the law reviews.
Speidel wrote the most important defenses of the approach. 4
The ALCOA long-term contract was detailed and complex, but much
boiled down, Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Essex
Group, Inc., (Essex) agreed in a long-term contract that ALCOA would

1. Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern ContractLaw, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1.

2. "It is easy to talk about efficiency, but it is hard to know whether any particular
rule or approach will produce an efficient result in the real world." Mark P. Gergen,
Victor Goldberg, Stewart Macaulay & Keith A. Rowley, Transcript, TransactionalEconomics:
Victor Goldberg's Framing Contract Law, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 469, 476 (2007) (quoting
Stewart Macaulay). The same could be said about any norm whether it be fairness,
autonomy, equality, or something else.
3. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
[hereinafter ALCOA].

4.

See Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 206-

08 (1982) [hereinafter Speidel, New Spirit]; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price
Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 369, 395-400, 421
(1981) [hereinafter Speidel, Court-ImposedAdjustments]; Richard E. Speidel, Excusable

Nonperformance in Sales Contracts:Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L.
Rrv. 241,276-79 (1980).
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convert alumina to aluminum for Essex.5 The price of conversion was
indexed, in part, to the wholesale price index for industrial commodities
(WPI). 6 The parties used this formula believing that it would accurately
reflect ALCOA's nonlabor costs. 7 The parties did not utilize a "costplus" formula apparently because ALCOA did not want to disclose its
costs directly to Essex.8 But that was a mistake. The parties' formula
ultimately "served as a lousy approximation of the project's cost to
[ALCOA]" due to inflation in oil prices and other circumstances that,
among other things, increased the price of electricity-a major cost in
the conversion process. 9 As a result, ALCOA would have had to supply
the aluminum at below-market prices and below its own costs, at a loss
of between $60 and $75 million.1" The court found in part that "the shared
objectives of the parties with respect to the use of the WPI have been
completely and totally frustrated."' 1 Nonetheless, Essex had refused to
negotiate a contract modification with ALCOA. 12 The court therefore
rewrote the contract's pricing term so that Essex would pay, at minimum,
ALCOA's costs of processing plus one cent per pound profit.' 3 Stewart
Macaulay wrote that this remedy was a compromise position in that it
created "a good price, but not the 'you-can't-believe-it14 good price"' that
Essex had enjoyed under the contract's express terms.
In a measured defense of the decision, Speidel pointed out that the
court's remedy was "sharply limited."' 5 Court adjustment would occur
only if the circumstances causing a major disruption were unanticipated16
and if performance was impracticable, meaning excessively costly.

5.

Essex supplied alumina to ALCOA for conversion, which Essex purchased

from a subsidiary of ALCOA. VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 351 (2006).

6. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 58.
7. Id
8. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 351; George S. Geis, Economics as Context for
ContractLaw, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 580 (2008) (reviewing GOLDBERG, supra note 5).
See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in ContractLaw,
109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000).

9. Geis, supra note 8, at 580-81.
10. Id Goldberg questions the accuracy of the amount of ALCOA's loss. GOLDBERG,
supra note 5, at 359.
11. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 56.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 80; Geis, supra note 8, at 581.
14. Gergen, Goldberg, Macaulay & Rowley, supra note 2, at 482.
15. Speidel, Court-ImposedAdjustments, supra note 4, at 380.
16. Id.
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Further, the remedy applied only to long-term contracts and would be
utilized only if the parties failed to agree to a reasonable modification. 7
In fact, Speidel criticized the ALCOA court for failing to delve
further
8
into reasons why the parties did not reach such an agreement.,
Under the conditions that Speidel outlined, he asserted that the
ALCOA decision reflected a "new spirit of contract," consistent with the
good faith performance and fair and equitable contract modification
standards. 9 According to Speidel, the decision meant that the party
"advantaged" by an unanticipated event had a duty to accept a fair adjustment
proposal made by the disadvantaged party. 20 Dereliction of the duty
meant that "the court may impose a price adjustment for the advantaged
party's failure to accept an equitable adjustment proposed in good
faith., 21 The court's remedy of court adjustment therefore forced
22 Essex
to do what it should have done under the new spirit of contract.
III.

JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO COURT

ADJUSTMENT IN A NUTSHELL

A. JudicialResponses
Most courts have exhibited lots of skepticism about the ALCOA case.23
But much of the criticism has focused on the court's determination that
ALCOA did not assume the risk of a rise in costs of the magnitude it had
experienced, not on the court's decision to adjust the contract assuming
some relief was in order.24 And even on the former issue, a few courts

17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 380 (quoting ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 91).

20.

Speidel, New Spirit, supra note 4, at 206-08.

21. Speidel, Court-ImposedAdjustments, supra note 4, at 421.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Beaver Creek Coal Co. v. Nev. Power Co., 968 F.2d 19, No. 894114, 1992 WL 113747, at *4 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) ("ALCOA
has generally not been found convincing by other courts."). But see Unihealth v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637-40 (D.N.J. 1998); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312
S.E.2d 765, 780 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring). Professor White and
David Peters argue that these cases do not support judicial adjustment. James J. White &
David A. Peters, A FootnoteforJack Dawson, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1954, 1973-77 (2002).
24. With respect to the substantive issue of risk allocation, the ALCOA court
incorrectly stated that "[t]he law of mistake has not distinguished between facts which
are unknown but presently knowable, and facts which presently exist but are unknowable."
ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64 (citations omitted). Another court pointed out that the court
in the venerable Sherwood v. Walker recognized that "where the existence of a fact is
unknowable, the parties... cannot make a mistake about it." Atlas Corp. v. United States,
895 F.2d 745, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Am.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at
68) ("[P]arties that have entered a contract or made payments knowing that they were
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have cited the decision favorably,2 5 or have recognized that the risk of
unanticipated events is not always allocated to the promisor-although
the ALCOA court's line of reasoning applicable
these courts have not found
2 6
to their particular

facts.

A few courts have singled out the ALCOA court's adjustment remedy
for scorn primarily because of the perceived lack of certainty and finality
in the approach: "Under the logical consequences of [ALCOA] there
would be no predictability or certainty for contracting parties who
selected a future variable to measure their contract liability. Whichever
way the variable fluctuated, the disappointed party would be free to
assert frustrated expectations and seek relief via reformation., 27 Another
court characterized judicial reformation as an improper role for courts:
"It is not the responsibility or function of this court to rewrite the parties'
contract to provide for [unforeseen] circumstances. 2 8 Overall, Sheldon
Halpern's observation is no doubt correct that the ALCOA decision has
"faded into obscurity" in the courts.

29

But the reasons for this are not

uncertain of material facts are barred from claiming resulting mistakes as a basis for equitable
relief.").
25. See, e.g., Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co., 710 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)
(noting impracticability or frustration may apply due to a change in economic
circumstance); Mill Run Assocs. v. Locke Prop. Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 278, 295 (E.D. Pa.
2003) ("The doctrine of failure of essential purpose provides that the subject matter of a
contract is an implied condition of the continuance and enforceability of the contract, and
that the contract is dissolved when the subject matter no longer exists."); Specialty Tires
of Am., Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(noting that foreseeability does not conclusively prove allocation of risk). But see In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981)
("While the Court has, most respectfully, some difficulty with the holding in Alcoa, it
has no difficulty in finding that, even under that court's expansive reading of mutual mistake,
Westinghouse's reliance on that defense is misplaced."); Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756
P.2d 1209, 1222 (Okla. 1988) ("[ALCOA] has been soundly criticized, and even if an expansive
view of ALCOA were adopted, the party presenting the defense of impracticability has
the burden of establishing the defense [and this burden was not met].").
26. See, e.g., Exelon Generation Co. v. Gen. Atomics Techs. Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d
2008) (distinguishing ALCOA because the Exelon contract had a
892, 903 (N.D. I11.
fixed price without an escalation clause).
27. Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 999 n.5 (N.D. 111. 1981); see
also Printing Indus. Ass'n of N. Ohio, Inc. v. International Printing & Graphic
Communications Union, Local 56, 584 F. Supp. 990, 998 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("This Court
is respectfully at odds with the reasoning and result in ALCOA.... The willingness of
courts to reform contracts on the basis of subsequent knowledge may undermine the
policy of finality which is so essential and revered in contract law."). White discusses
both cases in White & Peters, supra note 23, at 1976-77.
28. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 544 N.E.2d 920,924 (Ohio 1989).
29. Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability:
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necessarily the lack of wisdom in court adjustment. For example, Allan
Farnsworth reported a "toughening judicial attitude toward excuse based
on changed circumstances., 30 This observation points to the substance
of an excuse, not to the judicial remedy once a court finds grounds for
relief Perhaps courts have become tougher in recognizing an excuse because
disruptions of the kind experienced by ALCOA became more widespread
and foreseeable, not because of a judicial aversion to court adjustment.
Further, perhaps courts have resisted court adjustment simply because of
their wariness of major doctrinal change, not because of the merits.
Consider the amount of time before courts recognized the theory of
promissory estoppel. 31
B. Scholarly Discussions
1. Immediate Reactions
Jack Dawson led the charge against court adjustment, writing that the
ALCOA court's adjustment remedy was thoroughly "bizarre."3 2 Two of
Dawson's reasons stand out: courts lack the knowledge and resources to
write a better contract3 3 than the parties, and courts do not have the power
or authority to do SO.
As for the court's expertise and resources, Dawson wrote: "Nothing in
their prior training as lawyers or their experience in directing litigation
and giving coherence to its results will qualify them to invent viable new
designs for disrupted enterprises, now gone awry, that the persons most
concerned had tried to construct but without success. 3 4 Concerning the
court's power, Dawson opined: "[F]rom what source does any court
derive the power to impose on [the parties] a new contract without the
free assent of both?... For myself, I do not propose to spend time looking

Searchingfor "the Wisdom of Solomon, " 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1127 (1987); see also

United States v. Sw. Elec. Coop., Inc., 869 F.2d 310, 315 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
ALCOA has "faded into obscurity" (quoting Halpern, supra)); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 203, 214 (1990) (observing that the ALCOA case has had "negligible impact"). But
David Hoffman points out that many disputes that could be prime candidates for court
adjustment may go to arbitration instead.
30. Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 215.
31.
For a treatment of the history of promissory estoppel, see ROBERT S. SUMMERS
& ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND
PRACTICE 79-111 (5th ed. 2006).

32. John P. Dawson, JudicialRevision of FrustratedContracts: The United States,
64 B.U. L. REv. 1, 28, 30-38 (1984); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality
and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521, 522-24 (1985).
33. Dawson, supra note 32, at 37-38.
34. Id. at 37.

600
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for the source of the power. I am convinced that it does not exist." 35 In
part inspired to write by Dawson's piece, I found a limited role for court
adjustment.36 I argued both that courts could handle adjustment and that
they had the power to do so. Later, I summarized portions of my argument:
[S]urely the parties could do a better job [of rewriting their contract] themselves.
However, when parties cannot agree... on an appropriate adjustment formula, judicial
reformation, such as in ALCOA, doesn't seem that outlandish. For example, the
parties' goals in entering the contract and the contract's express terms may offer
guidance concerning how to adjust the contract. ALCOA bargained for a guaranteed
market for its services, which it achieved by contracting with Essex Group. Obviously,
it also desired to make a profit on the deal. Essex Group sought ALCOA's commitment
to perform the processing of Essex Group's aluminum at a reasonable price....
Other guidance also may be available. A court could look to similar contracts
made or modified by others under comparable conditions. A court could also investigate
documents or statements concerning the purpose of the use of the WPI in the
ALCOA contract. For example, if the parties intended the provision to assure that
ALCOA made a profit, a court could adjust the contract to ensure such a result.
As mentioned, critics also claim that courts do not have the power (meaning
authority) to adjust a contract for the parties because the strategy restricts the
parties' freedom of contract. But lots of evidence suggests that business parties
expect flexibility and cooperation when things go awry in their contracts. More
concretely, they expect their contracting counterpart to agree to an adjustment when
an unanticipated event means that one of them will suffer losses much greater
than either imagined when they made the contract. If the parties reasonably
expect adjustment, judicial reformation is only a form of specific performance
that supports parties' freedom of contract....
[In addition, i]f the court finds that the parties did not foresee the magnitude of the
problem that has developed and did not allocate its risk, then court reformation
does not impinge on the parties' freedom because the parties have left a gap in their
agreement.... The parties' failure to allocate the risk themselves arguably constitutes
implicit consent to allow the court to intervene to adjust the agreement for them.
Finally, the criticism of court reformation based on freedom of contract fails
to recognize that courts often "make" portions of contracts for the parties. ...
[F]or example,.., the UCC authorizes courts to fill gaps in contracts based on
reasonableness, instructs courts to excise unconscionable terms from contracts,
and allows specific performance according to terms the court views as "just."
In fact a UCC comment expressly authorizes judicial reformation in excuse
cases. 37 In addition, courts have long adjusted non-sale-of-goods
contracts,
38
including covenants not to compete, and land-sale contracts.

35. Id. at 37-38.
36. See Hillman, supra note 1.
37. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (2005) ("In situations in which neither sense nor justice
is served by either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse,'
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary .... ") (footnote in original).
38.

ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 319-20 (2004) (footnotes

omitted).
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2. More Recent Discussions
Scholarly discussion of court adjustment has not "faded away," at
least not to the extent that the ALCOA case faded in the courts. In recent
years, several writers have commented on the issue and it is fair to say
that these comments are a bit more tempered than Dawson's. Some
writers even seem willing, albeit grudgingly, to acknowledge that there
may be a place for court adjustment.
Some writers emphasized that the parties in the ALCOA case thought
their price formula would more reliably track ALCOA's costs. For
example, George Geis asked: "Should the court reform the contract
under the almost certainly correct assumption that the parties really
meant to write a deal that tracked [ALCOA's] actual costs more
closely? ' 39 For some, this assumption leads to the conclusion that Essex
would have received an unfair windfall under the contract as written.4 °
In fact, Donald Smythe pointed out that Essex "took advantage.., by
41
reselling millions of pounds of aluminum for an enormous profit.,
Although these observations do not speak directly to court adjustment,
the implication is that court adjustment should not automatically be ruled
out. After all, if the court excused ALCOA, it would have received the
windfall instead of Essex. If windfalls are the concern, the court's
intermediate approach therefore may make some sense.
A few writers thought that the ALCOA decision "signal[ed] to potential
breachers" an opportunity to settle favorably to avoid their obligations.42
But if the decision created incentives to settle disputes, this may be
beneficial, at least if the risk of the disruption was not clearly allocated
to the "potential breacher." For example, Stewart Macaulay recently3
surmised that the ALCOA case beneficially provoked settlement.
However, he worried that parties would plan better in the first place
without the availability of judicial reformation.44 Jim White and David
Peters also think that parties would negotiate new terms without judicial
reformation lurking in the background.4 5

39. Geis, supra note 8, at 582.
40. Carla Spivack, Of Shrinking Sweatsuits and Poison Vine Wax: A Comparison
of Basis for Excuse Under U.C.C. § 2-615 and CISG Article 79, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 757, 785 (2006).
41. Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability,and
the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 258 (2004).
42. Matthew Milikowsky, Note, A Not Intractable Problem: Reasonable
Certainty, Tractebel, and the Problem of Damagesfor Anticipatory Breach of a LongTerm Contractin a Thin Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 460 n.34 (2008).
43. Gergen, Goldberg, Macaulay & Rowley, supra note 2, at 482.
44. Id. at 483.
45. White & Peters, supra note 23, at 1972.
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Those recent commentators most dissatisfied with the ALCOA decision
are clearly motivated by ALCOA's failure to protect itself adequately in
the contract. For example, Richard Posner pointed out that ALCOA was
"highly sophisticated" with "long experience ... in designing the price
escalator clause" and noted that ALCOA consulted Alan Greenspan in
formulating the term. 46 Macaulay thought ALCOA's mistake occurred
even though ALCOA was a "well-represented major corporation"
Despite the resources and experience
attuned to "transaction plann[ing]."
of ALCOA, Victor Goldberg wrote that the parties' indexing technique was
"doomed" from the outset.48 But Goldberg did not rule out court adjustment,
observing that "[r]easonable people might disagree" on whether court
adjustment was justified "if the Alcoa-Essex contract was supposed to
mimic a cost-plus contract" and failed.49
Posner even intimated that ALCOA's experience and sophistication
should not necessarily deny it relief because it may not have been cost
effective for it to invest in allocating remote risks. In fact, he suggested
that court adjustment might be cheaper than drafting if the risk is
remote.50 However, Posner concluded that ALCOA, not the court, might
cost avoider in this instance, in part because of
have been the cheapest
51
Greenspan's help.
Perhaps the strongest recent criticism of the ALCOA court comes from
Jim White and David Peters in a recent summary of Dawson's views.
White and Peters claim that the court "threw caution to the wind" in
order "to impose a prospective solution., 52 The result "undermine[d]
public faith in the legal system and absolve[d] the parties of any
responsibility to negotiate over risks that are predictable but the exact
impact of which is unforeseeable." 5 3 I think White and Peters disagree
with the remedy of court adjustment.

46. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1601 (2005).
47. Gergen, Goldberg, Macaulay & Rowley, supra note 2, at 481.
48. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 349.
49. Id. And further: "The most charitable interpretation of the opinion ... is that
the judge imposed a cost-plus gloss on the contract which was not explicit in the
contract, but most likely comported with the parties' intentions." Id. at 369.
50.
Posner, supra note 46, at 1602.
51.
But Goldberg points out that Essex denied that ACLOA had received any help
from Greenspan. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 361. At any rate, would Posner reach the

same conclusion now that Greenspan has proven to be fallible?
52. White & Peters, supra note 23, at 1962-63.
53. Id. at 1963.
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IV. SPEIDEL MAY HAVE BEEN RIGHT

Here, I focus on the remedy of court adjustment, not on the
substantive question of when or if contract law should excuse a promisor
at all. 54 Although the two questions are obviously linked, I argue that
Speidel may have been correct about court adjustment as a viable remedy,
assuming a promisor has established a substantive right to relief (based
on an unallocated risk causing a severe disruption). In this context, court
adjustment should depend on whether it results in a net benefit greater
than the net benefit of excusing a promisor from the contract or refusing
to grant any remedy at all.55 The discussion in Parts II and III hardly
resolves this issue, but it does suggest many of the questions that must
be answered before contract law can reach any conclusion:
What are the goals of contract law and, in particular, of contract
remedies? At the risk of oversimplifying, the main goal of contract law
is to facilitate private exchange transactions. This goal implicates many
norms, including fairness, efficiency, and autonomy. These norms often
point in the same direction remedially, but not always. For example,
Posner asserts that court adjustment should depend on whether the court
or the promisor is the cheapest cost avoider, and he suspects that
ALCOA, the promisor, was that party. 56 But fairness requires courts to
avoid granting windfalls at the expense of a disadvantaged party, which
suggests that the court should deny Essex at least some of the gain it
would have realized by enforcing the contract. Finally, autonomy requires
identifying whether the parties reasonably expected their counterpart to
be flexible if things went awry, in which case Essex should have agreed
to an adjustment without litigation. Court adjustment under these
circumstances is merely a form of specific performance. Even if contract
law could identify the appropriate norm or norms to apply to court
adjustment, each of the above conclusions about what the norm dictates
is highly debatable, depends deeply on the context, and ultimately, may
be impervious to empirical testing.57

54. The substantive question is increasingly on everyone's mind, of course, as more
and more companies seek relief from their contractual obligations on the basis of the
financial meltdown. See, e.g., Michael Orey, Should a Severe Recession Void Legal
Obligations?,Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 2009, at 32. The government bailouts illustrate that the
only true issue here is whether courts should play any role in granting relief.
55. See Geis, supra note 8, at 582.
56. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of the vulnerabilities of empirical evidence, see Robert A.
Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REv. 819, 840-42 (2002). Some
empirical work suggests that people prefer windfalls to be shared equally. Christine Jolls
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1496
(1998).

604
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How best to create the appropriateincentivesfor the parties to avoid
contract breakdown? Would the availability of court adjustment create
perverse incentives, namely to contest contract terms, even in the
absence of legitimate substantive grounds for relief? If parties are more
likely to abide by their contracts in the face of clear contract rules, the
answer to this question depends on whether current excuse law is clearer
than a regime that recognizes a limited role for court adjustment. In
truth, current excuse law is hardly clear and requires delving into
questions of risk allocation, foreseeability, and magnitude of harm. Court
adjustment would require investigating all of these issues in addition to
adding a layer of remedial questions, but current excuse law has
remedial questions of its own: should a decision take into account the
parties' reliance interest, recognize the right to restitution, or simply
adopt an all-or-nothing approach?
Even if court adjustment increased disputes to some degree, what
would be the ramifications? Recall that one court said that the ALCOA
case would signal the end of predictability and certainty for parties using
indexing to determine their contract obligations: "Whichever way the
variable fluctuated, the disappointed party would be free to assert
frustrated expectations and seek relief via reformation. 58 This strikes
me as an alarmist overreaction along the lines of Judge Kozinski's
forecast that Justice Traynor's treatment of the parol evidence rule
would "chip ... away at the foundation of our legal system." 59 A party
seeking court adjustment would still face the hurdles of convincing the
court of the substantive merits of the excuse claim and that court
adjustment, an equitable remedy, was right for the case. In short, parties
may be "free to assert" the need for court adjustment, but that hardly
means they would succeed or even that they would bring such a claim.
And parties can contact out-of-court adjustment in the first place.
Ultimately, the truth is that we simply do not know if court adjustment
would lead to more disputes. I suspect that the legal regime governing

58. Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 999 n.5 (N.D. 11. 1981); see
also Printing Indus. Ass'n of N. Ohio, Inc. v. International Printing & Graphic
Communications Union Local 56, 584 F. Supp. 990, 998 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("This Court
is respectfully at odds with the reasoning and result in ALCOA.... The willingness of
courts to reform contracts on the basis of subsequent knowledge may undermine the
policy of finality which is so essential and revered in contract law.").
59. Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968)).
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long-term contracts may have little impact at all because, as Macaulay
and others have
taught us, business parties often pay little attention to
60
contract rules.

Even if contractors do pay attention to court adjustment and it
increases unresovable disputes, we have already noted that other values
are at stake in evaluating court adjustment. In short, fairness in resolving
disputes is another important norm in this context. And "at the margin
perhaps a fair resolution of disputes maximizes the benefits to society of
long-term contracts by encouraging people to enter into them., 6 1
All of this is fun to debate. The truths are nonetheless still not apparent.
What is the best way to promote reasonable settlement of disputes
once they have arisen? Even assuming that court adjustment decreases
predictability, perhaps this would lead to greater settlement of disputes
because parties will want to resolve them rather than face the unknown
of court adjustment.62 Macaulay and others intimate that this is exactly
what happened in the ALCOA case. 63 On the other hand, once a court
has adjusted a contract, settlement might be delayed or might be too onesided if court adjustment too heavily favors one or the other party. This
leads to the next question.
Do courts have the expertise to adjust contracts? This issue questions
the skill and acuity of judges. In addition to my argument above that
courts are not without guidance, 64 we should not forget that judges take
on hard cases all of the time. "Consider, for example, the substantive
and remedial complexities of securities, patent, and antitrust cases., 65 If
critics are correct that court adjustment is too complex for courts, then
the legal community should be looking for new ways to resolve those
cases, too. With proof of what the parties were trying to achieve, the
benefit of hindsight with respect to why they failed, and the help of
"special masters, magistrates, expert witnesses, and the parties and their
lawyers," perhaps courts can establish reasonable content for a courtadjusted contract.6 6
Do courts have the power to adjust private arrangements? In my
view, this argument against court adjustment is a nonstarter, although we
have seen that Dawson and others think otherwise. Assuming that the
parties had agreed at the outset to be flexible in the face of onerous
60. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L.
REv. 465, 467-68.
61. Hillman, supra note 1, at 33.
62. For more detail on this issue, see id.at 32.
63. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
64. See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
65. Hillman, supra note 1, at 25.
66. Id. at 26.
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unanticipated circumstances and that a court can approximate the
modification the parties should have made, court adjustment is either a
form of specific performance or a legitimate method of filling a gap in
the contract. 67 Both judicial functions are common for courts.
Should 'fault" and "windfall" principles influence whether a court
should adjust a contract? Some commentators single out ALCOA's
drafting and bargaining failures as grounds for criticizing the court's
decision.68 Others discuss Essex's potential windfall if the court had
enforced the contract as written. 69 These factors raise substantive questions
concerning whether ALCOA was entitled to any relief. They also impact
remedial choices. If ALCOA were blameless, for example, because it
was economically rational to decline to invest in allocating remote risks,
and Essex engaged in reselling that was not contemplated by the parties,
there seems little reason for an all-or-nothing approach.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have raised a lot of unresolved questions about court adjustment,
although, as I did years ago, I have tipped my hat as to where I would
come out on the issues. My main goal here was to see whether more
recent judicial and secondary writing shed better light. I believe the
answer to that question is no. So we can say no more than maybe Dick
Speidel was right about court adjustment.

67.
68.
69.

See supra text accompanying note 57.
See supra note 46-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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